Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1956

Dr. R. B. Lindsay v. Jennie Woodward : Brief of
Defendant and Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr.; McConkie & McConkie;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lindsay v. Woodward, No. 8492 (Utah Supreme Court, 1956).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2564

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

REt~;\m
-~··l~§@

In the Supreme Court

I If ·U,

of the State of Utah
~

.

PR.

.FILE

I.

-

R. B... LINDSAY.,

I '

.Pla~ntiff ant/ Respon(le.nt,

.-vs.-

-------------

lerk, s~pt'.;;~-c~~;t~

;·.· ··

Case· No.·
8492

JENNIE WOODWARD,·.·
·.·Defendant and Appellant.

·BRIEF -OF DEFENDANT. AND APPELLANT
~~...

OSCAR W. McCONK.IE,
of the firm

Jr.

McCONKIE ~ McCONKIE
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-·~---------------

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ...................................................................... .

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS ....................................................................

3

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................

4

(a) POINT NO. 1 and 2. The court erred in finding that

the defendant's claim, as set forth in her amended counterclaim, was heretofore completely released and discharged by a valid release executed and delivered by the
defendant on or about 27 August, 1954.
The court erred in finding defendant's claim, as
set forth in her amended counterclaim, is barred as
against this plaintiff by the judgment of dismissal with
prejudice made and entered in the Third Judicial District
Court of Lincoln County, State of Wyoming, 27 August,
1954, in the case entitled "Mary Jane Woodward, plaintiff vs. L. K. Olson, defendant.................................................

4

(b) POINT 3.

The court erred in finding that the claim
of the defendant, as alleged in her amended counterclaim,
is barred by the provisions of the Idaho Statute (1947)
Section 5-219, and by the provisions of the Utah Code
Annotated 1953, title 78-12-45 ............................................... 11

(c) POINT 4. The court erred in finding that the court has

no jurisdiction over the subject matter set forth in
defendant's amended counterclaim and that said amended
counterclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of the City Court
of Salt Lake City, from which the appeal in this case
is taken, and hence is in excess of the jurisdiction of the
District Court on appeal from the City Court, and that
by reason of the matters set forth in this paragraph
that the court ought not to assume or exercise jurisdiction and hear and determine the issues raised by said
amended counterclaim. .................................. ............................ 13
CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................... 14

AUTHORITIES
Statutes Cited
Title 78-12-45 U.C.A., 1953 .................................................................... 11
Section 5-218 Idaho Statute, 1947 .......................................................... 11
Section 5-219 Idaho Statute, 1947 .......................................................... 11
Section 3-505 Wyoming Statute, 1945 .................................................... 12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cases Cited
Page
Ash v. Mortenson, 24 Cal. 2nd 652, 150 P 2nd 876 -·············-··------····· 5
Bur v. Blumenthal, 166 Misc. 744, 2NYS 2nd 246 ---·--·······--···-·····-------· 10
Corbet v. Clark, 187 Va. 222, 46 SE 2nd 327 -------···---·······----·--··········· 9
Dickow v. Cookingham, 123 Cal. App. 2nd 81, 266 P 2nd 63 ............ 6
Giambozi v. Peters, Conn., 16 A 2nd 833 -----·--·-··--·-···-···············--········· 10
Greenbach v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F 2nd 942 -----························-···-··-·····-- 10
Mainfort v. Giannestras, 49 Ohio Ops 440, 111 NE 2nd 692 ---········· 8
Peteler v. Robinson, 81 U 535, 17 P 2nd 244 ---·-·····--·····-·····-···-·-········ 12
Viita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 155 NW 1077 -····-·-·---···-···········-·-······ 7
Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 A 602 --·--·--····-···-····---------------------·

Other Citations
Annotator A.L.R., 40 ALR 2nd 1075 ---···-·-·-······-···--······

... ............... 5

Corpus Juris, Vol. 48 page 1112 ---·····-··-------·-···--------------···········-··-·······- 9
Restatement of Conflicts, Paragraph 323 -----···-···--·······--·-····-········-··--· 12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

DR. R. B. LINDSAY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No.
8492

JENNIE WOODWARD,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment allowing plaintiff's motion for a Summary Judgment against the
Amended Counterclaim of the defendant and dismissing
the same with prejudice.
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As alleged in the Amended Counterclaim (R-9)
defendant was injured in an automobile accident on or
about 8 June, 1952, in or near Cokeville, Wyoming
(Deposition pg. 2). Plaintiff is and was at the time of
the accident a practicing physician in Montpelier, Idaho,
(R-1) and was employed as such to care for plaintiff's
wounds and injuries incurred and sustained in said accident (Deposition pg. 8-9) for compensation to be paid
therefore. Plaintiff entered into said contract of employment in Wyoming on or about 8 June, 1952 (Deposition
pg. 8).
Defendant filed an action on 16 October, 1952, in
Wyoming, against the driver of the vehicle with which
she was involved in said accident seeking damages for
personal injuries (R-14). Thereafter, 27 August, 1954,
defendant settled said suit upon receiving $5750.00 for
her injuries and signed a general release (exhibit B)
releasing all persons from any and all claims, present
and future, resultant from said accident. Pursuant to
stipulations said case was dismissed with prejudice
(R-22).
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in the
City Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, to recover monies
for professional medical services rendered defendant
(R-1). On 7 September, 1955, a default judgment was
entered against defendant (R-2) and defendant gave
notice of appeal (R-3) 30 September, 1955. Having
appealed to the Third Judicial District Court the defendant Counterclaimed ( R-4) and later amended her
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counterclaim (R-9) alleging malpractice and breach of
contract and fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment (Deposition pg. 17, line 15; pg. 18, line 2; pg. 35,
line 15; pg. 35, line 2; pg. 38, line 38; pg. 37, line 13;
pg. 48, line 10; pg. 59, line 28) on the part of the plaintiff doctor.
Plaintiff's motions to dismiss the appeal and to dismiss defendants counter-claim ( R -6) were denied ( R -8) .
Plaintiff's motion for a Summary Judgment was
allowed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM, AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, WAS HERETOFORE COMPLETELY RELEASED AND
DISCHARGED BY A VALII> RELEASE EXECUTED AND DELIVERED BY THE DEFENDANT ON OR ABOUT 27 AUGUST,
1954.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM,
AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, IS
BARRED AS AGAINST THIS PLAINTIFF BY THE JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE MADE AND ENTERED IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN
COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, 27 AUGUST, 1954, IN THE
CASE ENTITLED "MARY JANE WOODWARD, PLAINTIFF vs.
L. K. OLSON, DEFENDANT."
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIM OF
THE DEFENDANT, AS ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, IS BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE IDAHO
STATUTE (1947) SECTION 5-219, AND BY THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, TITLE 78-12-45.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER SET FORTH
IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THAT
SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDS THE JURISDICTION OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY, FROM
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WHICH THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE IS TAKEN, AND HENCE
IS IN EXCESS OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT
COURT ON APPEAL FROM THE CITY COURT, AND THAT BY
REASON OF THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN THIS PARAGRAPH
THAT THE COURT OUGHT NOT TO ASSUME OR EXERCISE
JURISDICTION AND HEAR AND DETERMINE THE ISSUES
RAISED BY SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM.

ARGUMENT
POINTS I AND II
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM, AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, WAS HERETOFORE COMPLETELY RELEASED AND
DISCHARGED BY A VALID RELEASE EXECUTED AND DELIVERED BY THE DEFENDANT ON OR ABOUT 27 AUGUST,
1954.
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM,
AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, IS
BARRED AS AGAINST THIS PLAINTIFF BY THE JUDGMENT
OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE MADE AND ENTERED IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN
COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, 27 AUGUST, 1954, IN THE
CASE ENTITLED "MARY JANE WOODWARD, PLAINTIFF vs.
L. K. OLSON, DEFENDANT."

These two points are herewith treated together because of similarity in argumentation. The District Court
and the jurisdictions which concur with its reasoning
apparently reach their conclusion that the release of the
original wrongdoer (by signed release or court action)
releases the attending doctor from liability for malpractice by treating the independent wrong doers as joint
tortfeasors, or applying, by analogy, the common law rule
of unity of discharge affecting joint tortfeasors. Mter
listening to this argument and such variations thereof as
the "but for" rule which holds that the release of the
original tortfeasor releases all subsequent tortfeasors because the injured party would not have been further
injured "but for" the actions of the original tortfeasor
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5
(as advocated in a note found 40 A.L.R. 2nd 1075) the
California Supreme Court holds in a well reasoned case
of substantially identical fact situation, Ash v. Mortenson
( 1944) 24 Cal 2nd 654, 150 P 2nd 876, wherein the
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and received medical treatment necessitated thereby; sued and
settled with the negligent motorist and judgment was
satisfied of record and plaintiff signed a general release;
the following year plaintiff sued attending doctor for
malpractice and in allowing such a suit the court said:
(page 877) "The independent and successive acts
of . . . (original tortfeasor) and defendant doctors,
differing in time and place of commission as well
as in nature, produced two separate injuries and
gave rise to two distinct causes of action. Plaintiff
was at liberty to sue ... for damages resulting for
the original injury alone, and to sue defendant's
for damages resulting from the additional injury
or aggravation, in separate actions; and the order
in which the actions might be brought would be
immaterial. The plea of former recovery, therefore, involves a consideration of what the injured
party did in fact recover in the action against the
original wrongdoer rather than what she could
have recovered therein ... "
"In other words, defendants seek to substitute
a rule of law for the factual defense of double
recovery. The rule contended for has been adopted
in numerous jurisdictions . . . But the conclusion
that the release of the original wrongdoer releases
the attending doctor from liability for malpractice
has been reached by treating the independent
wrongdoers as joint tortfeasors or applying, by
analogy, the common law rule of unity of dis-
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charge affecting joint tortfeasors. The common
law rule of unity of discharge is base? upon .the
concept of a unity of a cause of action agamst
joint tortfeasors and its application to the facts
of the present ~ase would give the independent
tortfeasors an advantage wholly inconsistent with
the nature of their liability. Moreover the rule
contended for . . . would stifle compromises, favored in the law, inasmuch as the injured person
could not effect a settlement with the original
wrongdoer without surrendering his separate cause
of action against one who, by his independent
tortious act, aggravated the injury."
"A release of a cause of action against a wrongdoer is not a release of a separate or distinct cause
of action against another independent wrongdoer."
In 1954 the California Court reaffirmed and
strengthened its above stated position in Dickow v. Cookingham ( 1954) 123 Cal App 2nd 81, 266 P2nd 63,
wherein the plaintiff had signed a release and discharge
of "all actions, claims and demands whatsoever, that may
now or hereafter exist against ... on account of injuries
to the person of . . . the undersigned, and the treatment
thereof and the consequences flowing therefrom . . . "
(Italics added) . The court agreed with the contention
of the plaintiff (page 66) " ... that neither by its terms
nor in fact did release apply to defendants (doctors),"
and further states:
(page 67) "We are of the opinion that the release
of the original wrongdoer should release an attend~n~ do~tor from liability for aggravation of the
InJury 1f there has been full compensation for both
injuries, but not otherwise."
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(page 68) " . . . parole evidence would be admissible to determine the intention of the parties in
giving and accepting the release . . . jury to pass
upon them ... The release may be a bar to the
present action, but its mere production does not
constitute it such."
The New Hampshire Court has recognized that the
ancient common law approach is not only unrealistic but
inequitable and holds that a release is not a bar to malpractice recovery in any event, but that compensation for
the original damage may be a bar. Wheat v. Carter
(1919) 79 N.H. 150, 106 A 602.
(page 603) "In other words, the test to determine
whether the release is a bar to his suit against the
plaintiff (Doctor) is to inquire as to the extent of
the claim he made at the time he settled with ...
(original tortfeasor) ."
In the instant fact situation the reasoning of the above
case leads toward an equitable solution. The injured
defendant testified (Deposition page 48 line 10) that
she did not know until years after the settlement that her
hip was injured and implies that her present hip injuries
were caused by the doctor's negligence and further testifies (Deposition page 59, line 28) that the plaintiff doctor
concealed the true nature of her injuries from her.
The Minnesota Court recognizes a liability upon a
doctor by virtue of the relationship between the doctor
and patient and holds in these settlement and release
cases that an injured party should not be barred from
collecting compensation for damages caused by a physician aggravating an injury, Viita v. Fleming ( 1916)
132 Minn 128, 155 NW 1077.
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(page 1080) " . . . there is a liability on the part
of the physician to the patient, it is a strain to hold
that a settlement between the injured man and
the wrongdoer for the injury by the accident ...
includes the claim that the injured man has
against the physician for a separate and subsequent injury."
Quite separate from this weight of authority by
virtue of reason and equity there is virtual unanimity in
decisions as pertaining to the liability of attending physicians in like cases wherein there is any evidence of a
separate tort committed by the doctor. In the instant
case several separate torts are alleged to have been
committed by the plaintiff doctor. Whether or not a
separate injury has been perpetrated on the injured
patient is held to be a question for the jury. In a case
wherein the doctor was sued for malpractice in caring
for a leg that had been shortened by a previous accident
and wherein the doctor claimed the plaintiff was barred
because of a previous settlement on the accident case,
M ainfort v. Giannestras ( 1951) 49 Ohio Ops 440, 111NE
2nd 692, the Ohio Court held:
(page 694) "If proven, they may present to the
jury, under proper instructions, the question
whether the negligence of the defendant (doctor),
if any, merely aggravated the original injury or
brought into existence an independant injury; in
other words whether such consequences arise in
any manner out of the accident originally complained of and as a proximate and natural result
thereof in an unbroken sequence.
"If said injuries are found to be the result of a
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distinct and independent wrong the release is no
bar to this suit."
In the case Cor bet v. Clark ( 1948) 187 Va 222, 46
SE2nd 327, the plaintiff started action against a dentist
for malpractice in treating injuries caused by a former
dentist. The defense was that plaintiff had signed a release and had judgment in a previous case against the
original dentist wrongdoer and it was contended ( 1)
the acts of the first wrongdoer had produced inseparable
injury to the plaintiff and (2) plaintiff could not state
what specific in juries were inflicted by the respective dentists and thus only one cause of action. The court concluded:
(page 330) "Under this circumstance the release
of the original wrongdoer should not effect plaintiff's right to recover damages for specific injuries
which she now alleges were inflicted upon her by
the gross negligence of Dr.... (defendant)."
"These are rna tters of proof."
In the instant case the defendant alleges that the plaintiff doctor committed the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment to her damage (R-10) (Deposition page 18, line 2 ; page 35, line 15 ) . She claims further
that she was separately injured by the plaintiff doctors
actions and lack of actions (R-9) (Deposition page 48,
line 10) . These are problems of proof and should not
be stricken by summary action of the court.
The very nature of the action brought by the
amended counterclaim herein forbids the action of the
District Court. 48 C.J. 1112 helps us to determine the
nature of malpractice action by defining it as:
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"ihe negligent performance of the dut~es which
are developed and inc?IDbent upon him. (physician) on account of his contractual relationship
with his patient."
In a Connecticut malpractice suit wherein a death
was caused by a blood transfusion of diseased blood,
Giambozi v. Peters_ ( 1940) 16 A 2nd 833, the Court
recognizes:
(page 835) "An action for malpractice presents
a claim of a hybrid nature. In one aspect, it may
be viewed as based on negligence; in another
aspect as based on breach of contract.
(page 836) "The right of action for death, .. .
was the result of a breach of contract to cure ..."
This contract theory is generally recognized in the
law. Even New York which follows the discredited ''but
for" or "by analogy, joint tortfeasor" theory of unity of
discharge holds in Bur v. Blumenthal (1938) 166 Misc.
744, 2 NYS 2nd 246, wherein plaintiff was injured irt
an automobile accident, signed a general release and
later sued the attending doctor for malpractice:
(page 247) "Satisfaction by the original wrongdoer of all damages caused by his wrong bars
action against the negligent physician who aggravated the damage . . . This rule, which releases
. . . (doctor) as a technical joint tortfeasor, can
not be construed to release him from the contract
claim contained in the third cause."
In a case not in point but wherein a defense against
a personal injury complaint was set up that plaintiff had
theretofore sued ·another, Greenbalch v. Shell Oil Co~
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( 1935) Utah 78 F 2nd 942, the federal district court
here gave this dictutn:
(page 994) "We are not aware of any sufficient
reason which should preclude a person who has
sustained an in jury through the wrongful act of
several persons from agreeing with one of the
wrongdoers, who desires to avoid litigation, to
accept such sum ... without releasing his cause
of action as against the other wrongdoers."
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIM OF
THE DEFENDANT, AS ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, IS BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE IDAHO
STATUTE (1947) SECTION 5-219, AND BY THE PROVISIONS
OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, TITLE 78-12-45.

The Idaho Statute (1947), Section 5-219, alluded
to in this point is a statute of limitations barring an action
for personal injuries unless the same is instituted within
two years after the date the cause of action accrued.
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 78-12-45 bars an action
in Utah if such action is barred in another state (R-15).
Neither of said statutes can be reasonably construed
so as to make them applicable to the defendant's amended
counterclaim wherein defendant claims (R-10) that the
plaintiff committed fraud and testifies (Deposition page
35, line 15; page 48, line 10) that he concealed the true
nature of her injuries from her and misrepresented her
condition to her. Defendant further states that she did
not discover the facts concerning this fraud until November, 1955 (R-10) (Deposition page 48, line 10). Indeed,
the Statute which is applicable is Idaho Statute ( 194 7),
Section 5-128 which reads:
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"An action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake. The cause of action in such case is not
deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by
the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake."
The Utah court reiterates this accepted rule of law that
the statute of limitations does not commence to run until
after discovery. In a malpractice suit in which a doctor
left a broken knife in the plaintiff's throat and then represented to the plaintiff that the throat would clear-up,
Peteler v. Robinson ( 1932) 81 U 535, 17 P 2nd 244, the
court said in holding that the defense of the statute of
limitations was not available because of the doctors concealment:
(page 250) "In courts of equity it is settled doctrine that a fraudulent concealment of a cause of
action will postpone the operation of the statute
of limitations until the discovery of the fraud, and
by weight of authority the same rule prevails in
actions at law."
It should be noted that the plaintiff first treated
defendant in the State of Wyoming (Deposition page 89)
and it was there the contract was entered into. Restatement of Conflict, paragraph 323 says:
"In case of an informal unilaterial contract, the
place of contracting is where the event takes place
which makes the promise binding."
It is alleged that defendant's damages, in part, stem from
a delinquency in this contractual relation. Wyoming
Statute ( 1945), Section 3-505, with relation to unwritten
contracts of this nature, provides an 8 year statute of
limitations.
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE COURT HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER SET FORTH
IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THAT
SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDS THE JURISDICTION OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY, FROM
WHICH THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE IS TAKEN, AND HENCE
IS IN EXCESS OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT
COURT ON APPEAL FROM THE CITY COURT, AND THAT BY
REASON OF THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN THIS PARAGRAPH
THAT THE COURT OUGHT NOT TO ASSUME OR EXERCISE
JURISDICTION AND HEAR AND DETERMINE TRE ISSUES
RAISED BY SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM.

The fourth paragraph of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (R-12), and the subject matter of point
4 herein, was not properly before the trial court in said
motion. Prior to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment plaintiff brought two motions: to dismiss appeal
and to dismiss defendant's counterclaim (R-6). These
motions in part were said to be "based upon the following grounds: 1. This Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the appeal. ... 5. The alleged counterclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of the City Court from
which this appeal is taken, and hence exceeds the jurisdiction of this court on appeal from the City Court.... "
The plaintiff's motions based upon the above stated
grounds were denied by the court ( R-8). Said grounds
are identical to paragraph four of the motion from which
this appeal is taken ( R -12) . The court had previously
ruled on the subject matter of paragraph four of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's counsel so stated to the judge at the time of hearing said
motion and no argument was entertained thereon. Thus,
any consideration of said paragraph by the court would
be improper and error.
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CONCLUSIONS
Appellant contends that she should not be barred
from her amended counterclaim against respondent doctor because of her release and judgment in a prior cause
of action against the original tortfeasor. The complained
of independent, successive acts of the doctor, differing
in time and place of commission as well as in nature
from the original wrong, constitute a separate cause of
action. The injured party should be allowed to settle
with one tortfeasor for the consequences of his acts, and
another for the consequences of his. To deny this would
deny adequate remedy to the innocently afflicted and
save harmless a wrongdoer.
In the instant case the doctor allegedly committed
numerous independent torts producing much harm. ~
~-L/~J.
•
~R9eBt should be allowed her day m court to present
evidence of her claims.
The nature of the cause of action, in part, is in
breach of contract. This cause of action still exists and
should be allowed to be heard.
ifl'l'4-//4.&-f"
~peaelent

claims that she has been the victim of
fraudulent misreprese~tation and concealment and that
discovery of such was not had until November, 1955.
Her cause of action commenced upon such discovery.
J'he District Court ruled in favor of the defendant
. ~eae@Rt when first confronted with the subject matter
of paragraph four of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. To re-present this same material for consideration
~jlell~,..
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to another division of the District Court would be improper, and in point of fact was not done. To rule upon
said material again would be error.
· Appellant respectfully urges the Court to reverse the
judgment of the trial court and permit her amended
counterclaim against plaintiff respondent.
Respectfully submitted,
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Jr.
of the firm
McCONKIE & McCONKIE
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant.
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